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One of the greatest peculiarities of the Spanish system of 
minimum income benefits is its complex organisation. There 
is a wide variety of specific means-tested benefits whose 
management and financing depend on the central govern-
ment. They are designed to protect different contingencies, 
providing very different levels of protection. On the other 
hand, the general risk of poverty is covered by regional 
governments without any coordination and financing from 
the central government. In this article, we provide a picture 
of the possibilities and limits of the current set of welfare 
benefits, focusing especially on its effectiveness in terms of 
reducing poverty. Our findings show that most benefits are 
clearly insufficient to cover the risk of poverty in terms of 
both incidence and intensity. The results show the need for 
the redesign of the system to better articulate existing ben-
efits in order to prevent new forms of poverty and to respond 
to emergency situations.
Key Practitioner Message: • The Spanish system of minimum 
income benefits consists of a varied mosaic of benefits that 
provide very different levels of protection for individuals or 
households with similar needs; • The contribution of these 
benefits to the reduction in poverty in Spain is very modest 
and significantly lower than that of contributory pensions; 
• The protection provided by MIBS is also unequal by popu-
lation categories.
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Minimum income benefit schemes (MIBS) have under-
gone major changes in most European countries. Most 
countries have put restrictive reforms into effect, estab-
lishing stricter time limits and imposing more onerous 
obligations on those receiving benefits. These schemes 
have also undergone major changes to foster transi-
tions from welfare to work. At the same time, there has 
been a shift from highly centralised to more mixed and 
decentralised MIBS. The most important challenge has 
been the difficult balance between the emergence of 
new social needs and the limits to increasing budgetary 
resources.
The global economic crisis that started in late 2007 
increased these constraints. The challenges of both 
improving labour incentives and pursuing greater 
efficiency in the allocation of benefits have been 
further intensified, occurring simultaneously with 
the need to provide only have to cope with the in-
creased economic needs that the crisis brought about 
but also to implement adequate activation strategies 
enough coverage to vulnerable households in the 
face of rising unemployment and poverty. The rise 
in the number of recipients challenged the capacity 
of the programmes and the social services, not only 
to cope with the increased economic needs that the 
crisis brought about, but also to implement adequate 
activation (Immervoll, 2010). On the other hand, be-
cause of the large variation in coverage offered by 
MIBS in European countries, the economic crisis has 
had very different impacts on poverty rates (Figari, 
Matsaganis, & Sutherland, 2013, Marchal, Marx, 
& Van Mechelen, 2011). In several countries, the 
growth of social needs was accompanied by a grow-
ing constraint on available resources.
The Spanish experience of minimum income ben-
efits is somewhat singular in this comparative frame-
work. Despite the remarkable transformation of the 
Spanish welfare state since the mid-1970s, access 
to social assistance remains underdeveloped for the 
needs of the population (Guillén & León, 2011). 
Unlike most countries in the European Union, there 
is not a MIBS that ultimately forms a homogenous 
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social safety net. The current system is a varied mo-
saic of benefits, with high levels of horizontal ineq-
uity and different levels of protection for individuals 
or households with similar needs. Some of these fea-
tures, which are characteristic of the Mediterranean 
welfare states, pose a major challenge to policy tra-
jectories aiming at providing basic floors of welfare 
entitlements and rights to all citizens within state ter-
ritory (Moreno, 2006).
Another peculiarity of the Spanish system is its 
complex territorial organisation. On the one hand, 
there is a wide variety of specific means-tested ben-
efits whose management and financing depend on the 
central government. Their access, coverage and dura-
tion of benefits are managed by different institutions 
and are designed to protect different contingencies, 
providing very different levels of protection and dif-
ferent requirements. On the other hand, the general risk 
of poverty is covered by regional governments without 
any coordination and financing from the central gov-
ernment. The result is a very complex system, with se-
rious problems of coordination and inequality between 
benefits and territories.
In addition to the abovementioned problems, the 
levels of most benefits comprising the last safety net 
are low, clearly far from European standards (Marchal, 
Marx, & Van Mechelen, 2014). It is not surprising, 
therefore, that Spain was one of the countries where 
poverty increased most during the crisis, especially 
when it is measured with more severe thresholds or 
using material deprivation indicators (Ayala, 2014). 
Minimum income benefits and the temporary solu-
tions for offering protection to households that had ex-
hausted the right to unemployment benefits (UB) were 
not enough to meet the increase in demand.
The aim of this article was to provide a robust pic-
ture of the possibilities and limits of the current MIBS 
in Spain, focusing especially on its effectiveness in re-
ducing poverty. Our results can be illustrative for the 
assessment of potential inequalities in the protection 
of different demographic groups in systems that are 
highly fragmented, both in institutional and territorial 
terms. Until now, the organisational problems directly 
associated with the system, with significant territorial 
and functional differences, have made this task ex-
tremely complex.
Using a mix of survey and administrative data, 
we provide the most exhaustive picture to date of its 
volume and the way it has evolved over time and, 
as an important contribution, of its limited ability to 
reduce poverty. Our research findings suggest that 
the contribution of MIBS to the reduction in poverty 
in Spain is very modest and significantly lower than 
that of contributory pensions. As a novelty, compared 
with previous studies, we also found that the protec-
tion received by the different demographic categories 
of the population varies considerably, as each group 
has access to specific benefits providing different 
protection.
The remainder of the article is organised as follows. 
The second section provides a summary of the main 
trends of the system in terms of recipients and spend-
ing. The third section analyses the adequacy of the dif-
ferent benefits. The fourth section examines the effect 
of benefits on poverty in terms of both incidence and 
intensity. The fifth section concludes.
Evolution of the system
As in most Western welfare states, the Spanish sys-
tem of cash benefits consists of two major types of 
benefits: those of a contributory nature, the most im-
portant of which are retirement pensions and unem-
ployment insurance, and minimum income benefit 
schemes. The structure of the latter is based on two 
differentiated components: social assistance protec-
tion derived from a previous contribution, and non-
contributory or welfare protection. Both levels are of 
a different protective nature that translates into cer-
tain types of inequality in the recipiency and inten-
sity of the protection received (different benefit 
levels and different time limits) and in the perfor-
mance of actions aimed at returning to the job mar-
ket. The philosophy supporting each one of the levels 
conditions the access, protection and coverage of 
each type of benefit.1 In this article, we consider as 
MIBS all the non-contributory benefits that are 
means-tested. This definition does not include any of 
the benefits that are provided to the population 
through the fiscal system.
The participation of distinct levels of public ad-
ministration makes MIBS more complex than in 
other countries in terms of management, design, reg-
ulatory capacity and funding of these benefits. On 
the one hand, the benefits from the central govern-
ment are provided by different public administrative 
bodies, such as the Public Employment Service, the 
National Social Security Institute and the Institute of 
Elderly Persons and Social Services (Table 1). On the 
other hand, in accordance with the current distribu-
tion of competencies, the last level of protection is 
provided by the Autonomous Regions (CCAA) via 
the so-called regional minimum income (RMI) pro-
grammes. The aim of these regional benefits is to 
serve as the last safety net against the general risk of 
poverty. Given the lack of coordination and financing 
1 In this context, the age and household type are decisive fac-
tors for accessing minimum income benefits. Therefore, eman-
cipated young people or people under 45 years of age with no 
family responsibilities have a lesser length of time for economic 
protection. Employees with precarious or low-paying jobs are in 
many cases also at risk of poverty.
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from the central government, Spain has a diverse mo-
saic of regional welfare benefits with intense differ-
ences in terms of assessing and measuring economic 
needs and eligibility and defining economic protec-
tion or family responsibilities.
Out of all the benefits that make up MIBS, the oldest 
are those that aim to cover the risk of old age and dis-
ability.2 Their greatest increase took place with the 
Non-contributory Pensions Act of 1990, which at-
tempted to ensure an economic benefit for all retired or 
disabled citizens who needed it.3 The new law mod-
ernised the system of non-contributory protection for 
older aged persons – the former system of benefits of 
the National Fund for Social Assistance (FONAS) – and 
for persons with disabilities – Social Benefits for 
Disabled People (1984). The former instruments re-
mained in force for people who could not move into the 
new system. This Act also implied an important change 
in family benefits, with the introduction of a new bene-
fit within the social security system for each dependent 
child. The number of people receiving these benefits 
has undergone a marked anti-cyclical evolution. Child 
benefit is still limited to families with very low incomes 
who receive very low annual amounts. Also included 
within the MIBS is a maternity allowance for employed 
or self-employed women who, in the event of child-
birth, meet all the requirements for accessing the mater-
nity benefit except for the required contribution period.
A debated issue in the definition of MIBS in Spain 
is whether minimum pension supplements must be 
considered as benefits within these schemes. When 
the level of the contributory pension does not reach 
the amount defined as minimum, there is a right to 
receive this supplement. Given that they are ben-
efits whose origin is contributory, it is not clear 
that they should be considered within the MIBS. 
Furthermore, the high number of people receiving 
these supplements could bias the analysis of the fig-
ures of MIBS beneficiaries. However, some authors 
and the official institutions themselves usually in-
clude them. In our analysis of the system as a whole, 
we provide information on the number of and expen-
diture on these supplements in order to assess their 
weight over the total. This is not possible in the case 
of the effects on poverty, since this information is not 
available in household surveys.
A second block is made up of regional minimum 
income benefits. These benefits are the only instru-
ment that offers general protection against the risk of 
poverty and is completely decentralised. This issue 
has been a permanent feature in its evolution, with 
regard to both the design of the benefits and its fund-
ing, which has corresponded exclusively to territo-
rial governments, which has given rise to significant 
differences in both the nature of the benefits and the 
coverage offered beyond the differences in the cost 
of living in each territory. Currently, there are 19 
different RMI benefits, with important differences 
in access requirements, economic protection and 
activation. The basic question is not only whether 
the differences among territories imply significant 
inequalities in the coverage received by households 
with lower income, but also if some autonomous 
regions are paying amounts that are below a basic 
minimum. As Figure 1 shows, the level of benefit in 
some regions is more than double that in others.
A third block of benefits includes unemployment as-
sistance. An aspect that separates Spain from the EU 
average is that although social expenditure is lower, the 
money spent on unemployment benefits with respect to 
other categories of social expenditure is overrepre-
sented. It even occurs in periods when economic 
growth is more intense and unemployment rates are 
relatively low.4 This feature indicates how unemploy-
2 Old Social Welfare fund benefits are managed by the re-
gional governments.
3 Non-contributory retirement and disability pensions are 
managed by regional governments, but regulated and financed 
by the central government.
4 Social protection benefits as a percentage of GDP amounted 
to 21% in Spain and 24.8% in the EU-28 in 2008, while it was 
24.9% and 27.5%, respectively, in 2014. At the same time, ex-
penditure on unemployment protection amounted to 10.8% of 
total social protection benefits in Spain and 4.8% in the EU-28 
in 2008, while it was 10.8% and 5.1%, respectively, in 2014.
Table 1. MIBS benefits provided by the central government.
Public Employment Service National Social Security Institute Institute of Elderly Persons and Social Services
Subsidy for insufficient contributions Non-contributory maternity subsidy Non-contributory retirement pension
Subsidy for having exhausted the contributory benefit Subsidy for 
people over 45 whose contributory benefit has exhausted
Minimum pensions Non-contributory disability pension
Subsidy for review of disability Supplements Social benefits for disabled people (replaced)
Agricultural subsidy for residents in Extremadura and Andalusia Child benefit Old social welfare fund (replaced)
Agricultural income
Subsidy for emigrants who have returned to Spain
Subsidy for released prisoners
Active placement income
Subsidy for people over 55
Temporary programmes, such as the Professional Requalification 
Program and the Employment Activation Program
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ment protection contributes to the functioning of the 
economic system and the labour market in Spain, char-
acterised by a high level of temporary employment and 
turnover between working and being unemployed. It is 
necessary to distinguish between unemployment insur-
ance (UI) and unemployment assistance (UA) benefits. 
Only the latter are part of the MIBS.5 The rotation that 
structurally characterises the Spanish labour market, 
together with the prolonged unemployment spells 
during the 2008 recession, has caused a considerable 
number of beneficiaries to shift to the assistance side of 
this protection.
There are other benefits included within the MIBS 
for certain groups of unemployed workers. Subsidies 
for temporary agricultural workers are among them. 
Agricultural income is an unemployment benefit di-
rected to temporary workers residing in Andalusia and 
Extremadura. The Agricultural Subsidy is an unem-
ployment benefit for temporary workers of the Special 
System for Agrarian Employees of Social Security. 
Another specific subsidy is the Active Placement 
Income (RAI), created in the late 1990s. This benefit is 
intended for unemployed people over 45 years of age 
who have been in this situation for at least one year and 
with family burdens, and who have exhausted the right 
to unemployment benefits
As can be seen in Table 1, there are several types 
of unemployment benefits. The different schemes 
managed by the Public Employment Service – with the 
exception of the RAI and the temporary benefits that 
were created in the 2008 crisis – are included in what is 
called unemployment assistance.
As a first step, it is essential to have a diagnosis that 
adjusts to the possibilities and limits of the current 
system and, especially, to have an accurate picture 
of how it has evolved. Until now, the organisational 
problems directly associated with the MIBS system, 
with significant territorial and functional differences, 
have made this task very complex. The administra-
tive information, which is particularly valuable for 
knowing the scope of the system, was very disperse 
because it came from different sources and it was not 
possible to simultaneously use all the information 
necessary for laying out the general picture. Although 
the advances in the use of the administrative records 
of these benefits have been important, new steps 
are still necessary to have databases that allow for a 
more robust evaluation of the entry and exit dynam-
ics in the different programmes. Although there is 
one source that could collect all these transitions, i.e., 
the Social Security Benefits Register, it offers only 
static information on the combinations of benefits that 
households receive at any given time. To systematise 
the number of recipients and the expenditure in these 
programmes, we jointly exploited the administrative 
records of the Social Security, the Institute of Elderly 
Persons and Social Services (IMSERSO), the Public 
Employment Service (SEPE) and the administrative 
records of the regional minimum incomes.
5 UI benefits are paid to workers who have lost their job or 
whose temporary contract has come to an end, who can work 
and want to work, and who have paid UI contributions while 
working for at least 12 months during the past 72 months (ex-
cluding civil servants and workers hired by private households). 
The length of UI entitlement varies between 4 and 24 months, 
depending on the number of the months that contributions were 
made during the past 72 months. The gross replacement rate is 
70% for the first six months of UI receipt and 50% thereafter 
(60% before July 2012), although the benefit level is subject to 
a certain upper limit. Moreover, workers who are not eligible for 
UI due to the lack of a sufficient contribution history or who 
have exhausted their benefits may qualify for flat-rate UA bene-
fits. The UA benefit is means-tested, and its level and duration 
depend on the number of family dependents and the age of the 
recipient.
Figure 1. Differences in benefit levels of regional minimum income programmes (euros), 2016.  
Source: Authors, based on the records of the Ministry of Employment and Social Security.
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The main feature observed in long-term trends is 
the way the system has expanded (Figure 2).6 
However, the growth has not been continuous. It first 
started expanding at the beginning of the crisis in the 
1980s, when the number of benefits doubled. A sec-
ond expansion period occurred during the first half of 
the 1990s, when new benefits were introduced at the 
same time that a brief but intense recession affected 
the Spanish economy. The system’s last period of 
growth was caused by the change in the economic 
cycle in 2008, which meant that the number of bene-
fits rose from just over 4 million before the crisis 
(9.0% of the total population) to nearly 6 million in 
2015 (12.3% of the total population). This impact is 
even more defined when the analysis focuses on the 
set of benefits without taking into account minimum 
pension supplements and child benefits − with very 
high numbers of beneficiaries but very low benefit 
levels − thus reaching a historical maximum in the 
volume of the system, nearly doubling the figure of 
1.2 million benefits claimants in 2007 (2.8% of total 
population) to 2.2 million in 2015 (4.8% of total 
population).
The long-term changes in the volume of MIBS are 
also noticeable when the expenditure figures are an-
alysed, although there are some subtle differences 
(Figure 3). The expenditure had been relatively stable 
until the start of the crisis, rising sharply from 2008 and 
peaking in 2010 (nearly 22 billion euros). From this 
date, it began to drop progressively, while the number 
of beneficiaries remained more or less stable, causing 
the system to lose part of its protection capacity.
The evidence for the long-term determinants of 
changes in expenditure growth and the number of re-
cipients of minimum income benefits is very limited. 
Ayala and Pérez (2005) found that institutional factors 
6 For the sake of simplicity, we grouped several of the benefits 
included in Table 1 into the general category of unemployment 
subsidy.
Figure 2. Number of recipients of MIBS, 1991–2015.  
Source: Authors, based on the records of the Ministry of Employment and Social Security and the Ministry of Health, Social Services and 
Equality.
Figure 3. Expenditure on MIBS over the GDP (%), 1997–2015.  
Source: Authors, based on data from the Spanish National Accounts and the records of the Ministry of Employment and Social Security, and 
the Ministry of Health, Social Services and Equality.
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were more important in the changes in the caseloads 
than were macroeconomic conditions. In a more recent 
contribution, Ayala and Triguero (2017) found that the 
economic cycle has a great influence on the number of 
recipients.
In practice, the fact that the MIBS comprises benefits 
of a very different nature makes it difficult to correctly 
identify which are the main drivers of the long-term 
changes of recipients and in expenditure. Apart from 
the different legislative changes that may affect eligibil-
ity and benefit levels, non-contributory retirement and 
disability pensions have as their main driver the ageing 
process of the Spanish society, and are much more in-
dependent of the economic cycle. In contrast, the trends 
of unemployment-related benefits are highly dependent 
on the changes in macroeconomic conditions. In the 
hardest moments of the crisis that began in 2008, the 
unemployment benefit accumulated more than half of 
the total beneficiaries of the MIBS – if minimum pen-
sion supplements and child benefit are not taken into ac-
count. The drastic growth in unemployment until 2013 
increased the size of the whole system. In the expan-
sionary phases, however, the demographic factors and 
the reforms introduced in the different schemes had a 
greater weight, as happened in the mid-1980s and at the 
beginning of the following decade.
The limited adequacy of minimum income benefits
The primary goal of MIBS is to act as the final 
economic safety net in the fight against poverty. 
However, in practice, the fear that the benefits would 
lead to less workforce participation or the option in 
some schemes for more categorical and selective 
benefits has meant that the benefit levels were estab-
lished by taking into account other criteria besides 
poverty reduction. These criteria respond to differ-
ent constraints, such as limited budgetary allocation. 
In the Spanish case, in addition to the possible in-
adequacy of benefits, we must also add the possible 
problem that adequacy rates might differ consider-
ably given the mosaic of benefits mentioned above. 
If this were so, the MIBS system would be affected 
by severe equity problems, offering different protec-
tion depending on the population category even if the 
needs were the same.
In the analysis of the effects of the system on 
poverty, one of the most relevant issues is how to 
measure the adequacy of the different benefits. The 
concept of the adequacy of benefits refers to the use 
of very diverse approaches. In a restrictive interpre-
tation, the adequacy could be approximated through 
the capacity of the benefits to satisfy the basic needs 
of the beneficiaries, regardless of how they are de-
fined. In most countries of the European Union, how-
ever, poverty is measured as a relative phenomenon. 
The most common procedure is to consider as poor 
those households whose income is below a threshold 
defined as a proportion of the median income. From 
this perspective, the adequacy could be measured by 
comparing the benefit levels with the poverty thresh-
olds. Recently, there has also been a tendency to relate 
benefit levels to earnings indicators, mainly because 
here the comparison between countries is simpler 
(Immervoll, 2010; Vandenbroucke, Cantillon, Van 
Mechelen, Goedemé, & Van Lancker, 2012). From 
a more general perspective, the adequacy of bene-
fits could also be considered as the capacity of the 
programmes to ensure that the growth in benefits 
does not deviate from the country’s economic growth 
(Iacono, 2017).
Following these criteria, there are three variables 
that were used for this study to compare benefit lev-
els (b): minimum wage, which we used to identify the 
relationship with low wages and, indirectly, with the 
level of prices; GDP per capita, which we used to relate 
benefit levels to average incomes as a broad measure 
of adequacy; and relative thresholds of poverty, calcu-
lated as percentages of the median income.
A first comparison takes the minimum wage (SMI) 
as the reference, making it possible to relate minimum 
income benefits to low wages (b/SMI). An indirect ad-
vantage of this option is that it also provides informa-
tion about the loss or gain of purchasing power of the 
benefits, as the SMI has traditionally been updated ac-
cording to the evolution of prices, except for the period 
between 2011 and 2015 when there were no changes. 
The changes in the corresponding ratio can be inter-
preted as gains (if the variation is positive) or losses 
(if negative) in the purchasing power of the different 
benefits.
Figure 4 shows the evolution of benefit levels in the 
most relevant minimum income schemes, with respect 
to the SMI and since the beginning of the 1980s.7 It 
also includes some of the most important contributory 
benefits: contributory pension, contributory retirement 
pension, and minimum retirement pension. We include 
these contributory benefits in order to assess the differ-
ences in adequacy, not only between the benefits that 
make up the MIBS, but also between these benefits and 
the most important contributory benefits. While the na-
ture of these contributory benefits makes the compari-
son with the poverty thresholds less relevant, since 
reducing poverty thresholds is not the aim of these ben-
efits, the analysis of their proximity or distance from 
the minimum wage or GDP per capita – as fundamental 
economic variables – can provide important social pol-
icy insights.
7 The unemployment subsidy is not included in the compari-
sons, given its fixed dependence during almost the entire period 
of the SMI’s evolution.
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The main features that stand out in this evolution 
are the presence of different periods of change in this 
relationship and the different trends of contributory 
and assistance benefits. While the former showed a 
clear upward trend with respect to the SMI, the min-
imum income benefits had a less favourable evolu-
tion. Also noteworthy is the continuous fall of this 
ratio before the crisis in both the non-contributory 
pensions and the active placement income (RAI), 
while in the case of the regional minimum incomes, 
which is the average of the regional programmes, the 
relationship had not changed substantially, moving at 
levels of approximately 60%.
In most regional programmes, due to the lack of 
co-financing from the central administration, the lim-
ited budgetary capacity severely affects the possibility 
of setting higher benefit levels. In addition, benefits 
were frozen in the crisis in several regions in Spain. 
Given that a similar process occurred in the SMI case, 
the ratio did not change substantially, hiding both a 
decrease in the protection provided by the regional 
schemes and the lower protection of low-wage work-
ers through the SMI. It should also be stressed that the 
divergence observed in the evolution of the protection 
provided by contributory and assistance benefits is a 
factor of inequality within the social protection system 
itself. The result is a greater differentiation among the 
beneficiaries of the Spanish system of social benefits, 
which limits its redistributive impact.
A second comparison can be made by relating the 
benefit levels to the average income of the Spanish 
population. A very general approach is to take the GDP 
per capita as a reference, since it provides a homoge-
neous series of the average living standard for a very 
long time period (b/GDPpc). Given the a priori inde-
pendence of the benefit with respect to the changes of 
the economic cycle, it is easy to anticipate that changes 
in the proposed relationship should depend fundamen-
tally on the type of cycle. While the gap should in-
crease during expansions, the opposite effect could be 
expected during recessions. These possible movements 
are linked, however, to the questionable assumption 
that the benefit levels are independent of the economic 
cycle. One might think that in recessions − as happened 
in the last crisis (Ayala & Triguero, 2017) − deci-
sion-makers introduce cuts to avoid spending levels on 
the programmes that are difficult to sustain in contexts 
of government budget deficits.
As Figure 5 shows, this countercyclical behaviour 
was present during a substantial part of the period under 
consideration, although there were some differences 
between contributory and minimum income benefits. 
In the case of contributory benefits, after an important 
revaluation process at the beginning of the 1980s and 
from the mid-1990s until the last crisis, the benefit lev-
els, with the exception of the minimum retirement pen-
sion since 2004, grew more slowly than the economy 
did. This process was reversed with the crisis, with an 
improvement of almost 15 points between 2007 and 
2013 due to the severe fall of the average income and 
the increase in benefit levels as a result of the growing 
number of new recipients entering into the system with 
higher pensions.
Convergence with respect to average income has 
been much slower in the case of minimum income ben-
efits, with less marked effects during recessions. While 
a clear distancing of the benefit levels with respect to 
the average income was observed during the period of 
economic boom before the crisis, the prolongation and 
intensity of the last crisis did not raise the indicator to 
the previous levels. At present, the benefit levels remain 
far from the average income of the Spanish population, 
Figure 4. Evolution of the benefit levels as a proportion of the minimum wage.  
Source: Authors, based on data from the Ministry of Employment and Social Security.
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which explains that although its contribution to the re-
duction in the most severe forms of poverty has been 
maintained, its effects on the distribution of income 
and relative poverty are very limited. The relationship 
is currently at levels below those registered at the be-
ginning of the 1990s.
Among the three options indicated, the most di-
rect and usual one for measuring the adequacy of 
minimum income benefits is comparing the benefit 
levels with poverty thresholds (z) for each type of 
household (b/z) (Figari et al., 2013; Marchal, Marx, 
& Van Mechelen, 2016). In the EU countries, these 
are determined as a percentage of the mean or me-
dian income. The resulting income level is inter-
preted as the line that defines a situation of relative 
poverty. The main advantages of this approach are 
the ease of calculating thresholds and indicators and 
the wide dissemination of its use in contemporary 
studies. As a relative approach, this type of proce-
dure has been subject to important criticisms, such 
as the arbitrariness of the percentage of income 
taken as a threshold, the sensitivity observed in pov-
erty results when modifying certain methodological 
decisions, and the problems to adjust the thresholds 
to different territorial areas with variations in the 
cost of living. The mentioned advantages and the 
possibility of making comparisons between coun-
tries and territories, however, make these thresholds 
the main reference in the analysis of poverty in the 
EU countries.
In Spain, the benefit levels analysed can be related 
to poverty thresholds calculated using the income data 
of the Living Conditions Survey (ECV). These levels 
can be differentiated by accounting for the size and 
characteristics of the household, given the different 
coverage of each type of household provided by the 
programmes.8 Figure 6 shows the relationship between 
the benefit levels and the corresponding poverty thresh-
olds, so that the percentages can be interpreted as the 
proportion with which the benefits cover the gap be-
tween the beneficiaries’ income and the poverty line.9 
As mentioned above, we focus only on the MIBS be-
cause the main aim of contributory benefits is not to 
reduce poverty.
This last indicator of adequacy shows important 
differences, both in the coverage of the poverty risk 
by each benefit and in the protection of different types 
of households. Given the similarity of the benefit lev-
els in the three schemes analysed and the considerable 
drop in the poverty line since the beginning of the cri-
sis − due to the relative nature of the threshold − the 
gap between the level of benefits and the poverty line 
has narrowed. This relative improvement is greater in 
the regional minimum income programmes than in the 
non-contributory pensions and the RAI. However, ben-
efits are clearly insufficient to cover the risk of poverty 
when the size of the household increases, with benefit 
levels below 50% of the poverty threshold.
The possibility of comparing benefit levels with 
poverty thresholds also allows the adequacy of benefits 
to be compared with the results from other European 
countries. The availability of a common database, such 
8 The equivalence scale used is the one considered by Eurostat, 
which assigns a value of 1 to the first adult in the household, 0.5 
to other adults and 0.3 to each child.
9 In 2013, the National Institute of Statistics introduced an im-
portant methodological change in the survey. Until that year, the 
information on income was that declared by the households 
when they were interviewed. From that year, the INE has used 
income data provided by the Tax Agency and Social Security. 
The series with income data with the traditional methodology 
can be reconstructed only up to 2014.
Figure 5. Evolution of the benefit levels as a proportion of the GDP per capita.  
Source: Authors, based on data from the Ministry of Employment and National Institute of Statistics.
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as the Survey on Living Conditions of the European 
Union (EU-SILC), allows for the calculation of pov-
erty thresholds for different types of households in all 
EU countries. Furthermore, there is relatively homo-
geneous information available on the benefit levels in 
each EU member state. For several years, the European 
Commission has regularly provided information on 
the characteristics of these programmes in its reports 
on social protection in the European Union. Through 
the Mutual Information System on Social Protection 
(MISSOC), the Commission regularly publishes in-
formation on the 12 main areas of social protection. 
However, the comparison may not be entirely perfect, 
since several countries have supplementary benefits 
that take into account a wide variety of personal and 
family characteristics (age, illness, housing expenses, 
educational needs, medical expenses and many other 
conditions) that are not easily identifiable in the avail-
able files.
To make the comparison as homogeneous as possible 
with schemes that cover the general risk of poverty, we 
take as reference the regional minimum income pro-
grammes.10 When considering this indicator for 
European Union countries, both the variety of results 
and the limited economic sufficiency of the Spanish 
minimum income schemes become obvious (Figure 7).11 
Whereas the benefits in countries such as Denmark prac-
tically cover the total risk of poverty and the indicators 
of Anglo-Saxon countries are not far from 75%, most 
countries offer levels between 50% and 70% of the pov-
erty line. These levels are higher than the average levels 
of the Spanish regions. However, the average value 
hides a great diversity of results, with marked differ-
ences among the regional programmes (Figure 8).
We also performed the same comparison using re-
gional poverty lines in the case of the Spanish pro-
grammes, thereby taking into account the average 
standard of living in each region. We found an evident 
improvement in some of the regions that have a lower 
average income, with results that better adjust to their 
budgetary possibilities. The opposite has occurred 
in some of the other regions, which have dropped to 
medium-to-low protection levels, while with the pre-
vious criterion they occupied some of the top positions 
in the ranking.
The overall balance that can be made is that the ade-
quacy levels of MIBS in Spain are rather low. The dif-
ferent adequacy measures considered suggest a serious 
problem with the system: (i) benefits are systematically 
insufficient to raise household incomes to the poverty 
line; (ii) they have distanced from other benefits that 
provide greater protection; and (iii) they have not reg-
istered significant improvements with respect to the 
average level of income.
Effects of minimum income benefits on poverty
Adequacy rate indicators provide an indirect measure 
of the potential effect of benefits to reduce poverty. Its 
overall effect, however, depends not only on whether 
benefits are close to the poverty line, but also on the 
number of people who receive them. To measure the 
effect of MIBS on poverty, it is necessary to compare 
the poverty rate in the current system with that which 
would exist if the different benefits reviewed in the 
previous sections had not existed. While the first type 
of data appears directly in household surveys, the sec-
ond requires some type of simulation.
10 We focus only on regional minimum income schemes be-
cause the information used to compare the other benefits within 
the EU countries is much more limited.
11 The benefits included in the comparison are the RMI 
schemes in the case of Spain.
Figure 6. Evolution of the benefit levels as a proportion of the poverty threshold.  
Source: Authors, based on data from the Ministry of Employment and Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida (National Institute of Statistics).
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The standard procedure for creating it is to es-
timate the hypothetical poverty rate by subtracting 
the corresponding benefits from the disposable in-
come and comparing this rate with the one resulting 
from disposable income. In the absence of benefits, 
households can only receive income from their par-
ticipation in capital and labour markets. Let us call 
xi this hypothetical income. When there are benefits 
and taxes, the disposable income of the household 
yi will be the sum of the market incomes (xi) minus 
the taxes paid (ti) plus the benefits received (bi): yi= 
xi – ti + bi.
As mentioned above, to identify the effect (E) that 
benefits have on poverty, we have to compare the pov-
erty rate of households when they only receive market 
incomes with the one that actually exists, in which house-
holds pay taxes and receive benefits: E= P(xi, z) – P(yi, z).
The usual criticism of this approach is the accep-
tance of the unrealistic assumption that taxes and bene-
fits do not affect the poverty rate and that if households 
Figure 7. Regional and European minimum income benefit levels as a proportion of the poverty threshold (%), 2014 (couple with two 
children, national thresholds).  
Source: Authors, based on the MISSOC Comparative Tables Database, the data for which come from the Autonomous Regions and  
EU-SILC (Eurostat). AN,  
Andalucía; AR, Aragón; AS, Asturias; CB, Cantabria; CL, Castilla y León; CM, Castilla-La Mancha; CN, Canarias; CT, Cataluña; 
EX, Extremadura; GA, Galicia; IB, Baleares; MC, Murcia; MD, Madrid; NC, Navarra; PV, País Vasco; RI, La Rioja; VC, Comunidad 
Valenciana.
Figure 8. Regional and European minimum income benefit levels as a proportion of the poverty threshold (%), 2014 (couple with two 
children, regional thresholds).  
Source: Authors, based on the MISSOC Comparative Tables Database, the data for which come from the Autonomous Regions and EU-
SILC (Eurostat). AN,  
Andalucía; AR, Aragón; AS, Asturias; CB, Cantabria; CL, Castilla y León; CM, Castilla-La Mancha; CN, Canarias; CT, Cataluña; 
EX, Extremadura; GA, Galicia; IB, Baleares; MC, Murcia; MD, Madrid; NC, Navarra; PV, País Vasco; RI, La Rioja; VC, Comunidad 
Valenciana.
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had only primary incomes, they would not change their 
behaviour (Ravallion, 2016). However, the simplicity 
of such calculations has made their use generalised.
To test how poverty changes with MIBS in terms 
of both incidence and intensity, we used the index pro-
posed by Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (FGT) (1984) as 
a poverty measure:
where q is the number of households whose incomes 
are below the poverty threshold and α is a parameter 
measuring inequality aversion. We used the most stan-
dard values of the index: (α = 0) makes the FGT equal 
to the headcount ratio, and (α = 1) provides a measure 
of the intensity of poverty.
We used this procedure with data from the Living 
Conditions Survey-2015. The poverty line was fixed 
at the baseline level. As in the previous analyses, we 
included both contributory and non-contributory ben-
efits to compare not only the effect that MIBS have 
on poverty, but also their potential to reduce poverty 
in comparison with that of contributory benefits. An 
important restriction is that the survey data do not dif-
ferentiate between contributory and non-contributory 
benefits. To differentiate them, we asked the National 
Institute of Statistics to produce a specific exploitation 
of the survey providing this disaggregation. Although 
it is possible to identify some of the benefits listed in 
the previous sections, because of problems of sample 
representativeness, the level of disaggregation is not as 
detailed. The survey also uses some categories of bene-
fits that are not perfectly equivalent to those used so far.
In general terms, the set of both contributory and 
welfare social benefits reduces the incidence of pov-
erty to less than half (Table 2). This overall effect is 
not evenly distributed by population groups. Benefits 
reduce poverty more among women than among men, 
with a distinctly lower effect on young people and 
children, although they were the groups most affected 
by the economic crisis (Coppola & O’Higgins, 2016). 
The opposite occurs with older individuals. The ef-
fect clearly decreases as the number of children in the 
household grows. The impact is greatly reduced in the 
case of immigrants from outside the EU, with a strong 
differentiation depending on labour status. The contri-
bution to poverty reduction is also much lower in the 
case of employed and unemployed people.
It is possible to disaggregate the effects on poverty 
according to types of benefits and types of households. 
Contributory pensions comprise nearly half the total of 
said reduction.12 The second type of benefit that con-
tributes the most to reducing poverty is UB (nearly 
9%), with the contributory benefit having a greater ef-
fect (practically two-thirds of the impact). At the oppo-
site end are child benefits, which, despite affecting a 
large number of households, hardly change the poverty 
rate.
This set of results is repeated in most of the so-
cioeconomic categories, although with subtle dif-
ferences. Especially coverage problems in the case 
of children stand out. In general, for these groups 
and households with children, the main instrument 
to avoid poverty is UB and, to a lesser degree, RMI 
schemes. The increasingly high child poverty rates 
in Spain are closely related to the insufficiency of 
the protection for low-income workers, the increased 
probability of unemployment, and family responsi-
bilities. In these households, child benefits hardly af-
fect the risk of poverty, having only a moderate effect 
in larger households. In the case of immigrants from 
outside the EU, their main form of protection against 
poverty is RMI schemes.
Therefore, the effect of MIBS on poverty is small 
in general terms and much less than that of contrib-
utory benefits. In addition, the fact that there are 
so many differences by socioeconomic categories 
shows that the heterogeneous mosaic of MIBS in 
Spain leads to very different levels of protection be-
tween households and individuals although they may 
be equally poor.
Another important dimension for assessing the 
effect of MIBS on poverty is its intensity, which 
is measured as the distance between the income of 
poor households and the poverty line. Although the 
benefits do not substantially reduce the percentage 
of households below the poverty line, they do have 
a significant effect of narrowing this gap. When the 
effect of benefits is measured in this way, a first rele-
vant result is a greater reduction in poverty than in the 
case of incidence (Table 3). The benefits reduce more 
than 70% of this gap with respect to the hypothetical 
case in which households do not receive transfers. It 
is, therefore, a system that is relatively effective in 
reducing poverty among people and households re-
ceiving benefits, but has significant problems with 
coverage of the most vulnerable population, which 
limits its effectiveness to reduce the extension of 
these situations.
Second, this capacity is very concentrated to cer-
tain benefits only, with the most important contribu-
tion − more than half of the effect − corresponding 
to contributory retirement pensions. There is also 
a more relevant quantitative impact of unemploy-
ment benefits − contributory insurance and subsidies 
jointly reduce 15% of the gap − than in the previ-
ous case, disability contributory pensions − causing 
a decrease of 7% of the intensity − and, to a lesser 









12 In the survey, the minimum pension supplements are not 
collected as a different benefit from the total pension.
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extent, regional minimum income programmes. 
Although the contribution of the latter is relatively 
small, it is considerably greater than that observed 
in the case of the incidence of poverty. It is therefore 
confirmed that these benefits are important in raising 
the incomes of recipients closer to the poverty line, 
but have a severe lack of coverage in a high propor-
tion of vulnerable households. The limited effect of 
non-contributory child benefits must also be noted, 
with a very residual contribution to reducing the gap.
The impact in terms of the intensity of poverty also 
differs substantially by population category, as indi-
cated in the previous review of the characteristics of 
MIBS. There is a serious problem of fragmentation of 
the whole set of non-contributory benefits. The effects 
of this issue are more relevant in the case of men, while 
the groups that receive less protection are young peo-
ple and children. In the case of these two groups, the 
bulk of the reduction in the intensity of poverty must be 
attributed to unemployment benefits and regional min-
imum income programmes, with a very limited contri-
bution of child benefits. As noted before, even though 
child benefits affect many households, their low levels 
make it difficult to narrow the gap.
In contrast, the protection of older aged persons is 
very high, reducing 90% of the problems of poverty in-
tensity, due mainly to contributory retirement benefits. 
This protection is much less effective in the case of sin-
gle-parent households, where the effect of benefits on 
the intensity of poverty is almost half that of the total 
population, and of large families, further confirming 
the weakness of family benefits. Other groups in which 
protection is less intense are non-EU immigrants, as 
well as the employed population, in the absence of 
instruments that supplement salaries when remunera-
tions are low and there are family burdens.
Given the limited contribution of the MIBs to pov-
erty reduction in Spain, different reforms have been 
proposed to improve their capacity. Some authors have 
used microdata and microsimulation models to assess 
the possible impact of different reforms in terms of cost 
and poverty reduction. A common result is that alter-
native developments of the current system would im-
prove its capacity to reduce poverty.
It is possible to group the simulations of the pos-
sible reforms into three different lines. A first one 
is focused on alternative designs for regional mini-
mum income programmes. One of the most import-
ant problems of these programmes is the low take-up 
rates in some regions of Spain. Due to the limited ter-
ritorial representativeness of household surveys, it is 
not easy to estimate the extent of this problem. Some 
authors propose using the number of no-income 
households collected in the Labor Force Survey to 
calculate the number of households that could apply 
for the regional minimum income benefits. There are 
some regions where the ratio between the number of 
households receiving the regional minimum income 
and no-income households is less than 10% (Ayala, 
2016).
Some authors have estimated what effect coverage 
would have if it were total. Fuenmayor and Granell 
(2015), for example, found that although the effects on 
moderate poverty would be small, its intensity would 
be reduced and, furthermore, the severe poverty rate 
would drop by half. Hernández, Picos, and Riscado 
(2020) also estimated what the results of these systems 
would be if the take-up were 100%. Their results sug-
gest that moving towards a subjective right approach 
would significantly increase the coverage of many re-
gional schemes, although with potentially substantial 
budgetary implications. Nevertheless, even under these 
conditions, these programmes’ potential would be still 
far from full anti-poverty efficiency. This goal can 
be attained only by increasing the adequacy of most 
schemes.
A second line of MIBS reform that has been sim-
ulated is the development of the system through 
non-contributory family benefits. Making use of 
the tax-benefit model for the European Union – 
EUROMOD, Cantó, Adiego, Ayala, Levy, and 
Paniagua (2014) simulated what would have been the 
impact of each regional child-related policy if each 
had been implemented in the whole country. Their 
results show that central government policies play 
a considerably larger role in reducing poverty risk. 
However, some regions’ policies perform better than 
others in reducing child poverty at a national level, 
and regional benefits and tax credits reinforce and 
complement the central government policies’ focus 
on younger children. Focusing more specifically on 
the non-contributory child benefit, Cantó and Sobas 
(2020) – also using EUROMOD– simulated the ef-
fects on poverty of alternative increases in the level 
of the child benefit. A new scheme that increased the 
threshold for accessing the benefit to 20,000 euros, 
and also increased its level to about 100 euros per 
month would be highly effective in reducing poverty.
The third line of simulation proposes a radical 
transformation of the system by replacing the cur-
rent MIBS with a basic income. Raventós, Arcarons, 
and Torrens (2016) proposed a scheme in which a 
basic income would replace all cash benefits, paying 
an amount equivalent to the poverty line. The mini-
mum threshold in the personal income tax would be 
eliminated, basic income would not be taxed, and 
there would be a single tax rate (49%). Other authors 
have found the cost of these proposals unaffordable. 
BBVA Research (2017) replicated these calculations, 
finding that the proposed changes would increase 
the tax burden by more than 15 points. Badenes-Plá, 
Gambau-Suelves, and Navas (2019) simulated two 
17© 2020 Akademikerförbundet SSR (ASSR) and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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reforms in a somewhat similar line. The first one im-
plies the replacement of all cash benefits – including 
the contributory ones – with a universal basic income. 
The second proposal – much less radical – maintains 
retirement pensions and eliminates the other cash 
benefits. Their results show that the current design of 
benefits has a greater effect on reducing poverty than 
the simulated reforms.
Conclusion
The Spanish system of minimum income benefits is 
somewhat singular in a comparative framework. It con-
sists of a varied mosaic of benefits that provide very 
different levels of protection for individuals or house-
holds with similar needs. Part of this variety of specific 
means-tested benefits depends on the central govern-
ment, but the different kinds of benefits are managed by 
different institutions. However, the general risk of pov-
erty is covered by the regional governments, without 
any coordination or financing from the central govern-
ment. The result is a very complex system, with serious 
problems of coordination and inequality among ben-
efits and regions. This problem widened with the crisis 
and the resulting emergence of new forms of poverty.
The economic crisis in Spain has left a strong mark 
on the labour market. The traditional profiles of pov-
erty, driven mainly by unemployment, have given way 
to new forms of social exclusion in which employment 
does not overcome poverty. The lack of a sufficient in-
come level has opened up new spaces of exclusion in 
relation to consumption, mental health problems and 
family conflicts. This context imposes two important 
challenges to the MIBS system. First, only some re-
gional benefits are compatible with, and complemen-
tary to, low wages, requiring a regulatory review of 
many public resources that were designed in a context 
in which employment was sufficient to overcome pov-
erty. Second, the traditional debate on the role of these 
benefits needs to be revised. While these resources can 
contribute to consolidating a precarious labour market, 
they still play a preventive role against the economic 
deterioration of many households.
Until now, the response of MIBS in Spain to new so-
cial needs has been to increase the number of benefits, 
to extend regulations with certain access-related excep-
tions or to design special programmes. Nevertheless, 
extending the map to respond to very specific needs 
has generated several loopholes and obstacles, largely 
in relation to uncovered situations of need and complex 
administrative procedures. In this regard, it is neces-
sary to simplify and standardise the administrative pro-
cedures and access requirements.
Moreover, the system also needs higher budgetary 
resources. Without improvements in adequacy ratios, 
it is difficult to think of long-lasting reductions in 
poverty and a shorter gap with respect to the EU aver-
age. The comparison of the evolution of benefit levels 
with those of contributory benefits also shows that this 
other gap between the two types of benefits has wid-
ened, thereby increasing inequality in social rights.
One of the fundamental contributions of this arti-
cle has been the analysis of the effects of this system 
on poverty in terms of both incidence and intensity. 
Our research findings suggest that the contribution of 
MIBS to the reduction in poverty in Spain is very mod-
est and significantly lower than that of contributory 
pensions. The very limited effect of some of the most 
widespread non-contributory benefits, such as child 
benefits, should be noted. Although they affect a large 
number of families, they have little effect on the inci-
dence and intensity of poverty. The impact of regional 
minimum income − the main tool to cover the general 
risk of poverty − is also very limited.
The protection provided by MIBS is also unequal 
by population categories. The most visible deficiency 
is the low coverage for minors and young people. For 
these groups, the main instrument for avoiding poverty 
is unemployment benefits and, to a lesser extent, re-
gional minimum income programmes. The high rates 
of child poverty in Spain, which have also been increas-
ing over time, are closely related to the inadequacy of 
protection mechanisms for workers with low wages, 
the higher probability of unemployment and family 
burdens. In these households, child benefits have little 
effect on the risk of poverty.
Another relevant result is that the greatest contri-
bution to poverty reduction occurs when poverty’s 
intensity is examined rather than its incidence. It is, 
therefore, a system that is relatively effective in reduc-
ing poverty among those individuals and households 
that receive benefits, but leaves an important part of 
the most vulnerable population without coverage. This 
reality limits its effectiveness in reducing the extent of 
poverty in Spain.
These findings may assist in the formulation of pol-
icies and an increase in outreach efforts. It is essential 
to increase the levels of spending on MIBS for an ef-
fective reduction in poverty. The system has a very lim-
ited incidence in terms of population size, especially 
given that some of the benefits that contribute most to 
increasing the total − such as non-contributory bene-
fits for dependent children − provide very low benefit 
levels, despite affecting many households. The reduced 
weight of spending over the GDP after the exclusion 
of benefits that complement contributory pensions and 
non-contributory child benefits confirms the very little 
impact of the system. Without greater resources and a 
better allocation of these resources, it is difficult for 
the system to substantially reduce the incidence of pov-
erty and to provide adequate answers to possible emer-
gency situations.
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Moreover, the strategy to build the last safety net 
through a very broad set of specific benefits produces 
great inequalities among population groups. A greater 
articulation of the set of benefits seems necessary to 
prevent these inequalities from becoming too large, as 
is the revision of the access requirements in order to 
adequately face the new forms of poverty, with a rec-
ognition of the outstanding preventive nature of these 
benefits. A greater structuring of the contributory and 
assistance subsystems and the improvement of the 
internal coherence of each subsystem are inevitable. 
Likewise, the differences in the benefit levels in the 
regional minimum income programmes are very broad 
− even greater than those of the countries with a federal 
structure. The participation of the central government 
in reducing the dysfunctions generated by a fully de-
centralised minimum income system seems essential.
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